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European Central Bank Working Paper Series 31Abstract:
This paper investigates the transmission of monetary policy using data from a panel of
Luxembourg firms. The results indicate that the sales accelerator may be at work. A very
robust result is the negative effect of the user cost of capital on firms’ investment ratio.
Changes in user costs are significantly affected by changes in the monetary policy
indicator. In addition, firm specific balance sheet characteristics, such as the lagged cash
stock to capital ratio influence the investment behaviour according to the broad credit
channel theory. Using various sample splits, it is shown that young firms, in particular,
are more sensitive to user cost changes, sales growth and the lagged cash to capital ratio.
Keywords:
JEL Codes: D21, D92, E22, E52
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Investment, User Cost of Capital, Credit Channel, Panel DataNON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY
Firms’ investment behaviour may be affected by at least two channels of monetary
transmission – interest rate channel and the credit channel – both of which are of key
interest to this paper. The interest rate channel refers to the direct impact of interest rate
changes through the user cost of capital on firms’ investment activity. The credit channel
refers to information asymmetries and other market frictions affecting the investment
behaviour of individual firms. Information asymmetries between firms and potential
lenders with regard to the true financial situation, investment opportunities, and thus the
appropriate market value of the firm, may result in an adverse selection problem driving a
wedge between the cost of externally raised funds and the opportunity cost of internal
funds. As a result, firms may have to pay an external finance premium, which is related to
the financial situation of the firm. In general, it is expected that the more creditworthy
firms are, the lower their external finance premium will be. The existence of a credit
channel would imply that monetary policy affects not only current interest rates, but also
the size of the external finance premium via reduced current and expected future profits,
lowering equity prices and hence collateral, which in turn amplifies the monetary policy
effect on firms’ investments.
This paper fits into a growing empirical literature that aims to analyse the existence of the
credit channel. The aim of this paper is to present first empirical results on the monetary
transmission process using Luxembourg firm-level data. More specifically, we investigate
whether Luxembourg firms’ investment is sensitive to the user cost of capital, to which
extent the user costs are affected by monetary policy, as well as to analyse the existence
of the broad credit channel. In doing so we make use of the sales accelerator model of
investment. The influence of the strength of firms’ balance sheets is proxied by the
inclusion of the cash level to capital ratio. Several sample splits are used to analyse the
presence of differential effects between firms. Samples are split with respect to age, size
and other characteristics such as the distinction between firms in the services sector and
firms operating within the industrial sector, as well as firms’ legal status.
The results suggest that the sales accelerator mechanism may be at work in the case of
Luxembourg firms. The estimated magnitude of the accelerator is, however, very small
This may be related to the short sample period of seven years, not capturing a full
business cycle. In line with a priori expectations, the coefficient of the user cost of capital
is negatively significant. This result is also remarkably robust to changes in the
specification and the definition of the user cost of capital. With regard to the cash to
capital ratio, the obtained results support the idea that the strength of the balance sheet
ECB • Working Paper No 111 • December 2001  5significantly influences the investment of firms, which is consistent with the arguments
forwarded by the broad credit channel theory.
Furthermore, the obtained results strongly suggest that young firms, in particular, seem to
be financially more constrained than older firms. Firms younger than seven years have
significantly higher sales growth and lagged cash to capital coefficients, as well as a
significantly higher user cost elasticity. The results also suggest that “constrainedness”
declines with increasing age, as the magnitude of the coefficients and their significance
generally decrease. In general then, younger firms are more dependent on internal
liquidity to finance their investments and are more sensitive to changes in the user cost of
capital and hence to monetary policy.
The results with regard to the differences between large and small, private liability and
public or industrial and service firms are less obvious. There is some weak evidence to
suggest that smaller firms rely more on internal liquidity to finance their capital
expenditures than larger firms, as they appear to be more sensitive to the lagged cash to
capital ratio. This is in line with prior expectations, as these firms are thought to have
worse access to capital markets. Service firms seem to be more dependent on sales growth
than industrial firms. Lastly, no significant effects with regard to the governance structure
of firms emerge.
A brief analysis of the relationship between the user cost of capital and the monetary
policy indicator reveals that monetary policy signals have the expected positive impact,
meaning that a positive change in the Belgian 3-month money market rate implies a
positive change in the user cost. Taking into consideration the results with regard to the
user cost, this indicates that monetary policy, indeed, affects firms’ investment behaviour.
In summary, this paper presents first results on the monetary transmission process for
Luxembourg firm-level data. The results suggest that the sales accelerator mechanism
may be at work. The strength of the balance sheet and, even more so, the user cost of
capital, are significant and robust determinants of the investment behaviour of
Luxembourg firms. Furthermore, young firms in particular show signs of being
financially more constrained, as their investment behaviour is more sensitive to changes
in the user cost of capital changes and/or internally generated liquidity. These results are
consistent with the broad credit channel theory.
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From a theoretical point of view, the monetary policy transmission process works through
numerous channels. Firms’ investment behaviour may be affected by (at least) two of
these channels – the interest rate channel and the credit channel. The interest rate channel
refers to the direct impact of interest rate changes through the user cost of capital on
firms’ investment activity.
1 The credit channel refers to information asymmetries and
other market frictions affecting the investment behaviour of individual firms. These two
channels are of key interest in this paper.
Information asymmetries between firms and potential lenders with regard to the true
financial situation, investment opportunities, and thus the appropriate market value of the
firm, may result in an adverse selection problem driving a wedge between the cost of
externally raised funds and the opportunity cost of internal funds. As a result, firms may
have to pay an external finance premium reflecting all types of costs associated with
overcoming the asymmetry between lender and borrower. The existence of the credit
channel would imply that monetary policy affects not only the level of the current interest
rates, but also the size of the external finance premium.
2
Firms’ external finance premium is related to banks’ loan supply and the firms’ own
financial situation. Firstly, according to the ‘bank lending channel’ theory, banks may
reduce loan supply following monetary tightening, as deposits decline. This may entail
considerable implications on firms' credit and investment decisions. Banks raise the
interest rates on bank loans, which in turn is likely to increase the external finance
premium. Alternatively, banks may start to ration credit, which affects bank dependent
loan applicants, i.e. small and medium size firms in particular. Secondly, according to the
‘balance sheet channel’ theory, the magnitude of the external finance premium is related
to the financial situation of the firm. More specifically, the more creditworthy firms are,
e.g., due to a large share of collateralised assets, deep pockets, or high net worth, the
lower their external finance premium will be. For given information asymmetries, the
strength of the balance sheet simply determines the risk the lender has to face and, via the
external finance premium, ultimately the amount of investment undertaken by the firm.
Adverse monetary shocks tend to increase the cost of debt, in particular that of short-term
debt, resulting in the reduction of firms’ profits. Rising interest rates also tend to worsen
firms’ expected future profitability and hence equity prices. This reduces firms’
                                                     
1  For a brief review of these channels see Mishkin (1995).
2  See e.g. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) or Hubbard (1998).
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strength of the balance sheet typically moves in a pro-cyclical fashion, the balance sheet
channel is said to amplify the effects of a shift in monetary policy or any other real shock.
This phenomenon has become known as the ‘financial accelerator’ mechanism.
A growing empirical literature analyses the effects of financial constraints on investment
behaviour of firms. Numerous contributions investigated whether the strength of the
balance sheet and other factors affect the external finance premium. Indicators most
commonly employed are the cash flow to capital ratio (e.g. Fazzari et al., 1988; Harhoff
& Ramb, 2000) and the (inverse) coverage ratio (e.g. Vermeulen, 2000; Mörttinen, 2000).
Furthermore, it has become custom to split samples according to some ex ante specified
size, age or liquidity criterion.
3
Other factors influencing the investment behaviour of firms have also been studied. The
effect of differences in dividend pay out have been analysed by Van Ees et al., (1998).
The empirical results indicate that debt constraints are particularly important for low
dividend pay-out firms, suggesting that the latter may suffer from asymmetric information
problems, which render external finance relatively more expensive than internal funds.
Haan & Sterken (2000) show that the external finance premium may also be influenced
by the governance structure of firms. Their empirical results indicate that quoted firms are
significantly less affected by monetary policy changes than non-quoted firms. Differences
between industries were analysed by Dedola & Lippi (2000) using industry level data for
France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the USA. Their results support the view that
monetary policy effects are strongest for the durable goods industry and for industries
characterised by small firm size and low leverage ratios. In general, the empirical results
seem to be consistent with the existence of a broad credit channel.
The principal aim of this paper is to present first empirical results of the monetary policy
transmission process for Luxembourg based on firm-level data. More specifically,
empirically investigate whether Luxembourg firms’ investment is sensitive to the user
cost of capital, to which extent the user costs are affected by changes in the monetary
policy indicator, as well as to analyse the existence of the broad credit channel. In order to
analyse the effects of the user cost and monetary policy on firms’ investment decisions,
we make use of the sales accelerator model of investment. In addition, we investigate
whether firms’ investment behaviour is significantly affected by the strength of their
                                                     
3  For an extensive list of contributions, see Bernanke et al., (1996).
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presence of differential effects between firms, we proceed in splitting the sample with
respect to age, size and other characteristics such as the distinction between firms in the
services sector and firms operating within the industrial sector, as well as firms’ legal
status.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section II illustrates selected aspects
of the Luxembourg firm environment and presents structural data. Section III concerns the
sales accelerator model. Section IV presents the micro data and variable definitions.
Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI concludes.
II. A BRIEF ACCOUNT OF SOME LUXEMBOURG PECULIARITIES
With an estimated population of approximately 440 000 people and a share of around
0.3% in euro area GDP, Luxembourg is the smallest economy in the European Union and
one of the original Member States of the European Community. The growth record of
Luxembourg throughout the last decade has been impressive. Average annual growth of
real GDP was around 7.2% between 1990 and 2000.
The rapid expansion of the Luxembourg economy owes much to the development in the
financial sector, which started in the early 1980s and still continues today. On 31
December 2000, the Luxembourg financial centre counted 202 banks and 647 monetary
and financial intermediaries (MFIs). They accounted for 7.1% of the total number of
MFI’s in the Euro area. This is a high share when compared to Luxembourg’s economic
weight in the Euro area. The sectoral composition of GDP also reflects the importance of
the financial service sector in Luxembourg. In 2000, the industrial sector, including
energy, accounted for about 13.2% of Luxembourg gross value added, while the Financial
Services sector accounted for roughly 40.5%. The rest is made up of Agriculture (0.7%),
Construction (6.3%), Retail Trade, Tourism, etc. (22.7%), and Other Services (16.7%). In
spite of the dynamic economic growth pattern, the institutional, social and political
settings are exceptionally robust.
In 1997, the market share of large banks (i.e. banks with total assets larger than Euro 6
billion) was 61.7%. This seems to be relatively high considering the presence of over 200
banks at the Luxembourg financial centre. Using a more sophisticated measure, such as
the Herfindahl index, the Luxembourg banking sector does not appear to be particularly
concentrated. In 1997, the market concentration in the Luxembourg banking sector was as
ECB • Working Paper No 111 • December 2001  9if the total market was divided equally between 34.5 banks. This is among the least
concentrated market outcomes in the Euro area (e.g. Ehrmann et al., 2001, table 2). Also,
the Luxembourg banking sector is characterised by a relatively low degree of state
influence. State influence in 1995, measured as the percentage of assets of the top ten
banks owned or controlled by the government, is with 5.1% among the lowest in the Euro
area.
The corporate finance structure in Luxembourg is characterised by strong bank-lending
relationships. In the second half of the 1990s, the share of outstanding loans to the non-
financial corporate sector in GDP navigated around 25%, thereby exceeding total gross
fixed capital formation on average by 15.8%. On the contrary, financing investment via
stock markets is only of secondary importance, as is reflected by the low number of
publicly traded companies. Only 60 out of the approximately 20 000 Luxembourg firms
were listed at the Luxembourg stock exchange in 2000. Equally, corporate bonds exhibit
only a minor role for Luxembourg firms’ investment. This underpins the high relevance
of bank lending in Luxembourg corporate finance.
Another peculiarity of Luxembourg is the long absence of an independent national central
bank. In June 1998, the Banque centrale du Luxembourg (BcL) had been established.
Only half a year later its decision powers were transferred to the European Central Bank
(ECB). The main reason for which Luxembourg did not have an independent central bank
prior to June 1998 is connected to the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union (BLEU) and
the monetary association between Belgium and Luxembourg, which were set up in July
1921.
4 This can be seen as the very first step in modern European integration per se. In
practice, this meant that a Belgo-Luxembourg customs union was established with free
trade within the customs area. The right to change the tariffs and enter trading agreements
with other countries lay in the hands of Belgium. Any third-party agreement was subject
to prior consultation of Luxembourg authorities. The Belgian Franc became legal tender
in Luxembourg while the reverse was de iure not the case.
5 The Institut Monétaire
Luxembourgeois (IML), the predecessor of the BcL, had only limited rights to issue new
Luxembourg Francs. Currency issuance had to take into account the Belgian Franc in
circulation in Luxembourg and the relationship between the populations of Belgium and
Luxembourg. The main task of the IML was banking sector supervision. The Banque
                                                     
4  For an account of the legal history of the Luxembourg Franc see Link (1995).
5 Note that, initially, the official exchange rate between Belgium and Luxembourg was not explicitly
specified. Both currencies, however, were defined according to the gold standard and according to almost
the same legislative text. With the exception of the period 1935-1944, both currencies circulated in
practice with an exchange rate of 1:1.
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banks, as well as foreign exchange operations. This also constitutes the reason for using
the Belgian 3-month money market rate as primary monetary policy indicator.
III. THEORETICAL ASPECTS
The most frequently applied approaches to estimate firms’ investment demand rely on the
Euler equation, Tobin’s q and the sales accelerator specification. Due to considerable data
limitations, and given that no information is available on firm-specific market
capitalisation, we are restricted to focusing on the ‘sales accelerator model’.
6
Sales Accelerator Specification
We essentially rely on the sales accelerator specification proposed by Bond et al. (1997),
where the desired capital stock for a given firm is defined as a log linear function of its
output and the user cost of capital.
t i t i t i UC b S a K , , , log log log − = ,( 1 )
where Ki,t , Si,t and UCi,t reflect the desired capital stock, sales and the real user cost of
capital, respectively. The subscripts i and t  denote the cross-section and the period
identifier.
This function is consistent with profit maximisation subject to returns to scale and a CES
production function, thereby allowing for a fixed capital-output ratio. Taking first
differences and applying the approximation  δ − ≈ ∆ − 1 , , , / log t i t i t i K I K , where Ii,t , K i,t
and δ   denote investment, the capital stock and the depreciation rate, respectively, one
obtains the following sales accelerator specification
t i t i
t i





, log log ∆ − ∆ + =
−
δ .( 2 )
The depreciation rate δ   will be subsumed into the unobserved latent variable. This
equation may be changed into an auto-regressive distributed lag specification in order to
allow for a smooth inter-temporal adaptation of the actual capital stock to the desired
                                                     
6  As the sales accelerator specification does not provide convergence of the current stock of capital to a long
run value, we also estimated an error correction specification. The results are, however, poor.
Furthermore, it remains unclear as to whether one may sensibly derive information about the long term
from a panel as compact as the one considered here. Therefore, the error correction specification will not
be pursued any further in this paper.
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IV. DATA, VARIABLES AND ESTIMATION METHODOLOGY
Data
The data are taken from Luxembourg firms’ annual, consolidated where available,
balance sheets as published by the Bureau Van Dijk (Belgium). The time period under
investigation ranges from 1992 to 1998. In order to prolong the panel, data from the
BELFIRST and the AMADEUS data set were merged.
7 For the purpose of the analysis,
data from both databases were made compatible. The database initially covers 266 firms.
We decided to identify outliers along the time series dimension at the individual firm
level and not as a function of a multiple of the inter-quartile range around the median. The
reason for doing this is that the panel contains firms from very different industries, which
reveal large discrepancies with respect to size, age or legal form, which may justify
significant differences in investment structures. For example, young and dynamic firms
may display much higher investment or sales growth rates. Also, the investment ratio of a
manufacturing firm may be very different form that of an estate agent.
Unless applied to well-defined intra-homogeneous sub-samples, the removal of outliers
based on multiples of the inter-quartile range does not discriminate between different
industries and their characteristics, and may therefore eliminate firms from the sample for
the wrong reason. Furthermore, such a method may not identify implausible jumps in the
firms’ individual investment behaviour through time, as no connection is made between
individual firms and time. As our panel is compact, splitting into sub-samples as required
by any sensible removal of outliers based on percentiles is infeasible.
Instead, we perform a plausibility check in identifying changes along the time dimension
for each firm separately. In doing so, we tried, as far as possible, to take into account the
                                                     
7 The  BELFIRST database is a subset of the AMADEUS database that includes Belgian and Luxembourg
firms’ balance sheets only.
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cross-section, the year-on-year change is either below or above a certain threshold.
However, to ensure that true underlying changes, as opposed to data errors, do not lead to
the exclusion of an otherwise impeccable observation, implausibility additionally requires
the subsequent year-on-year change to exceed the threshold values. The threshold level is
initially set to ±  40%. This is to say that we eliminate one-period spike formations or
trough formations for which the initial and succeeding boom and bust rate both exceed a
threshold of ±  40%.
8 Also worthwhile noting is that the plausibility check was run on the
raw data and not on the variables included in the estimation.
Table 1:










Fishery 1.0 0.4 1.9 n.a. n.a.
Extraction, Industry,
Energy & Water 14.6 17.3 15.5 5.1 14.7
Construction 6.2 8.3 11.1 8.2 23.2
Retail Trade, Repairs,
Domestic Articles 10.6 10.0 15.5 35.1 22.5
Hotels and Restaurants 2.6 2.6 5.3 12.9 4.4
Transport and
Communication 9.3 8.2 7.3 5.4 7.6
Financial Intermediation
and Insurance 38.1 27.7 21.1 4.5 12.2
Other Marketable
Services 17.6 25.5 22.4 28.9 15.4
Note: Columns 1-3 refer to ESA 95, while columns 4-5 refer to NACE 1. Columns may not add
up exactly due to rounding differences.
Source: STATEC
At the beginning of 2000, a total of around 20 000 firms were registered in Luxembourg.
As illustrated in table 1, roughly 60% of these registered firms had salaried employees.
Only around one sixth of all registered firms belong to the industry sector. In contrast,
approximately 60% of the firms used in this paper’s empirical analysis belong to the
manufacturing sector. Therefore, the empirical analysis cannot be taken as an accurate
                                                     
8  The sensitivity of the estimations has also been explored using an alternative threshold value of ±  20%
(see appendix table A1).
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Luxembourg manufacturing sector.
Variable Definitions
Estimates of the firm specific capital stock have been obtained in using the perpetual
inventory method. As a benchmark, the depreciation rate is assumed to be six percent.
9
The investment to capital stock ratio is defined as  1 , , / − t i t i K I , where It and Kt-1 denote
nominal investment and capital stock respectively.
Sales are simply approximated by firms’ turnover, as genuine sales data were not
available. Factors feeding into the user cost are the monetary policy indicator, which is of
particular interest to this study and economic and legal variables, such as the depreciation
rate and expectations on the future price level. The user cost of capital definition used in
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UC, p
I , p, d and wr respectively represent the user cost of capital, the price level of
investment, the economy-wide price level, depreciation in percentage terms and the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). As above, the subscripts i and t denote the
cross-section and time period identifier. This user cost of capital measure is dynamic in
the sense that it includes expectations regarding prices of investment goods. The static
equivalent is obtained in abstracting from 
I
t i p 1 , + ∆ . The presented estimations will use the
dynamic specification. This is because estimated results are stronger and more plausible
and also reflects that, as expected, the forward-looking element seems to matter.
The firm-specific weighted cost of capital, wr, involves weighting of the gross debt share
by the debt interest rate and the own funds share by the equity interest rate eri,t . The
weighted cost of capital specification given in specification (5) relies on the apparent
interest rate ari,t .
11 The apparent interest rate is a proxy for interest paid on debt. It is a
                                                     
9 The sensitivity of the estimates was assessed in using an alternative depreciation rate of 8% (see appendix
table A1).
10  We also experimented with other user cost of capital definitions in order to assess the sensitivity of the
obtained results. These are shown in table A2 in the appendix.
11 Please refer to table A2 in the appendix for results using the monetary policy indicators, such as the 3-
month money market rate in Belgium instead of the apparent interest rate, ar.
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The equity interest rate er is defined as  ep dr er
long
t i t i + = , , , where 
long
t i dr,  denotes the
long-term debt rate, which we take to be the 10-year Government bond in Luxembourg.
ep denotes the equity premium in percentage points, which is assumed to be 6%.
12
Table 2 provides some basic descriptive statistics of the benchmark sample used in the
regressions. The investment ratio is relatively small when compared to other studies
within the MTN. This may be due to the fact that investment had to be calculated as the
difference in tangible fixed assets between two years from the asset and liability
statement. This is somewhat dissatisfactory, but inevitable, given that data on genuine
investment were not available from the income statement. The benchmark depreciation
rate is set to be 6%. As noted above, this yardstick also enters the capital stock equation.
Its underlying assumption may be meaningful from a macroeconomic perspective, but
may not correspond to the accounting practice of firms, which, at least in part, may
explain the low investment ratios obtained. If this was the case, one may argue that the
bias is constant over firms and time and hence subsumed into the constant.
Table 2:
Summary Statistics of Variables used in Estimation
Tangible
Assetst
a 1 / − t t K I Salest
a
t Sales log ∆ UCt t UC log ∆ Casht-1 / Kt-1
Mean 1001320 0.052 2314871 0.003 0.106 -0.052 0.822
Maximum 52829569 2.331 20733000 0.646 0.196 1.408 36.643
Minimum 1375 -0.654 156645 -1.221 0.022 -1.597 0.000
Std. dev. 4695595 0.227 3029574 0.180 0.031 0.347 3.313
Observations 517 436 429 349 445 365 285
Cross-sections 80 80 80 80 80 80 80
a In 1000 LUF
                                                     
12  The sensitivity with regard to the equity premium was also explored. See table A1 in the appendix.
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Dynamic user cost of capital Static user cost of capital
3-month money market rate Belgium
In particular, the user cost of capital measure deserves some attention. The values are
within a plausible range, and correspond closely to those provided by other MTN
contributions. The medians of the user cost of capital indicators appear to follow the
monetary policy indicator. As explained above, the differences between dynamic and
static specification of the user cost of capital measure can be explained by the inclusion of
the forward-looking component in the former measure.
Most of the other explanatory variables are self-explanatory. A more detailed description
of the individual variables is given in table 3.
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Depr  Assets Tang  Assets Tang
−
− + −   . . .
Capital, (K) According to Perpetual Inventory Method, taking first
balance sheet value as initial value.
Depreciation, (d) Depreciation rates assumed to be 6% in the
benchmark case. The sensitivity with regard to 8% is
explored.
Investment Price Deflator,(p
I) Derived from national accounts.
Price Deflator,(p) Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices.
Sales,(S) Sales are approximated by turnover.
User Cost of Capital, (UC) According to equations (4) and (5).
Apparent interest rates are calculated from firms’
balance sheets according to equation (6).
Long-term interest rate refers to the 10-year
government bond in Luxembourg.
The equity premium is assumed to be 6% in the
benchmark case.
Short-term interest rate refers to 3-month money
market rate for Belgium or Germany.
Cash Stock (CS) Cash and Cash Equivalent.
Age Dummy (Age) Dummy variable: We used the 30%, 50% and 70%
values of the Gompertz function as threshold values.
Legal Form Dummy, (LF) Dummy variable: 0 if private liability company, 1 if
public company.
Industry Services Dummy (IS) Dummy variable: 0 if services, 1 if industry.
Size Dummy (SIZE) Dummy variable: Discrimination of small and large
firms according to total assets. The cut-off threshold
value is the 30% value of the cumulative distribution
function.
a Sales are not deflated, as deflation by the Harmonised Index of Consumer Price was found not to
affect the estimated results in any significant way.
As illustrated in the introduction, the empirical results of other studies are generally in
line with the ideas forwarded by the broad credit channel theory as the investment of
smaller and younger firms is found to be more sensitive to the user cost and cash flow to
capital ratio. However, it is not always clear whether the statistical significance of the
individual coefficients can be taken at face value, i.e. can be taken to reflect the presence
of financial constraints and asymmetric information. A possible explanation for the cash
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Hence, it is not entirely clear whether cash flow signals the profitability of investments,
not being captured in basic sales specifications, or whether cash flow represents a source
of cheap internal funds for firms relative to external finance. Furthermore, if cash flow is
correlated with firms’ future profitability, then a significant relationship between cash
flow and investment could simply reflect the relationship between expected profitability
and investment emphasised in the neo-classical investment theory.
13 Similar to other
studies in this area, this unresolved issue will have to be borne in mind when interpreting
the estimates obtained within this study.
Trying to be less subjected to the above criticism, we use the level of cash rather than
cash flow as our primary balance sheet indicator. Cash levels say little or nothing about
the quality of future investment projects and hence have little or nothing to do with the
profitability of investments. According to the advocates of the credit channel theory,
financially constrained firms are more likely to have to resort to internal financing, i.e.
one would expect a positive correlation between being constrained and the level of cash.
Consequently, we use lagged rather than current cash divided by the lagged capital stock
as our primary balance sheet indicator. This is because it is the cash reported in the
closing balance of the preceding period, which represents the level of cash available to
the firm at the beginning of the reporting, i.e. investing, period.
Sample Splits
Several different proxies are included to analyse differential effects between different sub
samples. These are also shown in table 3. The working hypothesis is that young, small,
private liability and unquoted firms, as well as service sector firms have different sales
growth, user cost and cash stock sensitivities. Hence, we analyse the presence of
differential effects in using interaction variables. All exogenous variables are interacted
with a dummy variable, indicating whether or not firms meet some kind of ex ante
specified criterion, such as age, or firm size.
Unfortunately, the linear age variable probably cannot be taken to reflect credit
“constrainedness” in a sensible manner given that time, ceteris paribus, will not reduce
financial “constrainedness” at a constant degree (i.e. regardless of the age of any given
                                                     
13  The current debate owes much to Kaplan and Zingales (1997, 2000) who refute, both on theoretical
grounds and on the basis of their empirical results, the idea that higher cash flow sensitivities can be
interpreted as evidence for more severe financial constraints. Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hubbard (1998)
acknowledge this ambiguity but defend this interpretation in a comment on Kaplan & Zingales (2000).
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transformation basically draws on the idea that, initially, the access of young firms to
credit is rather restricted and time may not improve bank-firm relationships and banks’
credit risk aversion in a proportional way until a sufficient level of reliability, confidence
and continuity is attained. At some intermediate age level, the marginal impact of age on
access to financial resources may be increasing. Once a certain “maturity stage” has been
achieved, the role of age with respect to access to financial resources will become
negligible in that bank-firm relationships are fully established and additional age will not
per se lead to higher credit worthiness.
Figure 2:

































Variable age tolerance (Gompertz) Constant age tolerance (Age)
According to these assumptions, the relationship between age and credit
worthiness/access to financial resources may be described by a s-shaped pattern, as
illustrated in figure 2. Modelling is done by means of the following Gompertz-type
function,
) (      
A f e tr e L A
β α
− − = ,( 7 )
where L, A and A
tr denote the maturity level, age and transformed age, and α  and β
denote calibration parameters.
For simplification and interpretation purposes, the transformed function was normalised
so as to yield results between 0 (maximum age-related financial constraints) and 100
ECB • Working Paper No 111 • December 2001  19(minimum age-related financial constraints). Furthermore, α  and β  were defined in order
to obtain no significant reduction in “constrainedness” below the age of five, as well as no
considerable further improvement beyond the age of 15 years.
Estimation Methodology
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in dynamic panel data estimation results in
OLS estimates being biased and inconsistent, as not only the dependent, but also the
lagged dependent variable is a function of the firm-specific error term  i η . Hence, the
lagged investment ratio is correlated with the error term (e.g. Baltagi, 1995). Estimation
by means of Generalised Methods of Moments (GMM) provides consistent and unbiased
estimates (e.g. Arellano & Bond, 1991). However, due to the rather short and wide nature
of the panel, the loss of observations in using lagged variables as instruments, either in
levels or in first differences, would be extremely high. Also, GMM estimates may be
unreliable in cases where no appropriate instruments are available (e.g. Mojon et al.,
2001).
Trognon & Sevestre (1985) show that the consistent estimator lies in between the OLS
and WITHIN estimates. The OLS estimator overestimates the true coefficient, while the
WITHIN estimator underestimates the true coefficient. The magnitude of the bias
depends, among other things, on the size of the coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable and on the so-called intra-class correlation coefficient. In reporting both
estimations, an upper and a lower bound for the value of the consistent estimator may be
provided. In light of the severe sample size restrictions in our case, providing OLS and
WITHIN estimates may prove a valid alternative. This is particularly the case if the
estimated coefficients are close to each other.
Furthermore, as the lagged values of sales growth, user cost, and the balance sheet items
are not significantly different from zero, the subsequently presented estimations rely on
the restricted specification of equation (3).
14 The basic sales accelerator specification to
be estimated can be summarised as follows:


















                                                     
14  Estimation results of the unrestricted specification, including lagged sales and user cost growth, are
available upon request.
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estimates are presented. Firstly, specification (I) presents the empirical estimates of the
basic sales accelerator specification augmented by the lagged cash stock to capital ratio.
Specification (II) explores differences between various sub samples. Specification (III)
presents some results with regard to monetary policy changes and its impact on the user
cost of capital. The notation (i) and (ii) refers to OLS and WITHIN estimates
respectively.
Specification (I): The Benchmark Specification
The results of specification (I) in table 4 provide some evidence in favour of the sales
accelerator mechanism in the case of Luxembourg firms. The sales growth coefficient is
positively significant in the OLS specifications while it not significant in the WITHIN
estimations.
15 The low magnitude of the sales growth coefficient in the OLS estimation,
ranging around 0.08, as well as its insignificance in the WITHIN estimation, may be
related to the short sample period, not capturing a full business cycle.
The results with regard to the user cost of capital are as expected. The coefficients range
between –0.084 and –0.152 and are significant at the 5% level or better, regardless of
whether referring to the OLS or WITHIN estimation. The size of the estimated
coefficients seems to be on the low side compared to other studies in the literature (e.g.
Harhoff & Ramb, 2000). Also worthwhile noting is that the differences between the
estimated coefficients in the respective OLS and WITHIN estimations are relatively
small.
16
With regard to the lagged cash to capital ratio, the WITHIN estimations seem to provide
stronger results. The estimated coefficient is 0.025 and significant in specification (I-ii).
This result supports the idea that the strength of the balance sheet influences the
investment of firms, which is consistent with the arguments forwarded by the broad credit
channel theory. Bearing in mind that the coefficients should not be taken at face value, the
                                                     
15  We refrain from providing the long-term elasticities of the individual coefficients. This is because our
lagged dependent variable is often insignificant, the specifications do not contain any lags and the period
under investigation does not cover a full business cycle. This calls into question the entire concept. The
interested reader may easily compute the long-term coefficients by dividing the individual coefficients by
1 minus the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable.
16  However, the theoretically derived property that the OLS overestimates the true coefficient while the
WITHIN estimator underestimates it, does not seem to hold for the estimated user cost and cash to capital
ratio coefficients, as the coefficients are smaller in the OLS specification than in the WITHIN
specification.
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V. EMPIRICAL RESULTSinclusion of the balance sheet indicator does not affect the sales growth or user cost
coefficients in a significant way, as is shown by a simple Wald-test. This can, however,
not be said for the lagged investment ratio coefficient.
Table 4:
Estimates for the Investment Ratio
Specification (Ia-i) (Ia-ii) (Ib-i) (Ib-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN
Dependent variable 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I
Cross-sections 80 80
Observations 257 195
2 1 / − − t t K I 0.082 -0.061 0.245 *** -0.126 *
0.052 0.040 0.074 0.073
t SALES log ∆ 0.079 ** -0.042 0.081 ** 0.002
0.035 0.039 0.038 0.050
t UC log ∆ -0.099 ** -0.084 *** -0.152 *** -0.125 ***
0.039 0.027 0.049 0.032
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.002 0.025 ***
0.003 0.008
R-Squared 0.054 0.482 0.163 0.626
Adjusted R-Squared 0.043 0.237 0.145 0.346
F-Statistic 4.788 *** 8.080 *** 9.258 *** 61.948 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent and obtained
using the plausibility threshold of ± 40%, the dynamic user cost, the apparent interest rate in
the WACC definition, and a depreciation rate of 6% in the capital stock calculation.
Specification (II): Differential Effects
Specification (II), presented in tables 5 and 6, analyses the existence of differential effects
between different sub-samples. Due to the short and narrow data set, an interaction
variable approach was selected and it was decided not to use separate estimation for
various sub-samples. We analyse whether small, young, service sector or private liability
firms are different in terms of investment behaviour. According to advocates of the credit
channel theory, these results are consistent with the idea of those firms being financially
more constrained.
Adopting this line of reasoning, the obtained results strongly suggest that young firms, in
particular, seem to be financially more constrained than older firms. Firms below a
threshold of 30% according to the Gompertz function
17 (specification (IIa-i)) have a
significantly higher sales growth and lagged cash to capital coefficients, as well as a
significantly higher user cost elasticity. The magnitude of the respective coefficients is
                                                     
17 Within the given environment, this corresponds to firms of an age of less than seven years.
ECB • Working Paper No 111 • December 2001 22quite revealing, though this fact should not be emphasised too much, as we know that the
estimates are not entirely consistent. With the exception of the user cost, this effect also
appears in specification (IIa-ii). The estimated results also suggest that the
“constrainedness” declines with increasing (transformed) age, as the magnitude of the
coefficients and their significance generally seem to decrease.
18
Table 5:
Differential Effects for Young Firms
Specification (IIa-i) (IIa-ii) (IIb-i) (IIb-ii) (IIc-i) (IIc-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN
Dep. variable 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I
Cross-sections 78 78 78
Observations 191 191 191
2 1 / − − t t K I 0.256 *** -0.107 0.271 *** -0.114 0.250 *** -0.099
0.078 0.075 0.081 0.079 0.082 0.081
t SALES log ∆ 0.068 * -0.015 0.061 * -0.014 0.065 * -0.029
0.036 0.050 0.037 0.050 0.038 0.051
t UC log ∆ -0.156 *** -0.123 *** -0.148 *** -0.119 *** -0.162 *** -0.123 ***
0.050 0.032 0.051 0.034 0.055 0.033
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.001 0.018 ** 0.002 0.019 *** 0.002 0.023 ***
0.003 0.007 0.003 0.007 0.003 0.008
Interaction var. Gompertz Gompertz Gompertz
Threshold value <30% <50% <70%
Corresponds to <7 years <8 years <11 years
2 1 / − − t t K I -1.098 *** 0.638 *** -0.602 *** 0.126 0.041 -0.060
0.358 0.220 0.161 0.138 0.238 0.233
t SALES log ∆ 0.595 *** 0.290 *** 0.321 0.355 ** 0.100 0.231
0.158 0.080 0.319 0.147 0.167 0.142
t UC log ∆ -0.588 *** -0.078 -0.303 *** 0.049 0.022 -0.029
0.136 0.140 0.086 0.080 0.134 0.068
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.057 *** 0.055 *** 0.052 *** 0.054 *** 0.034 0.068 ***
0.007 0.007 0.012 0.009 0.026 0.022
R-Squared 0.198 0.645 0.204 0.644 0.181 0.646
Adj. R-Squared 0.163 0.357 0.169 0.356 0.145 0.360
F-Statistic 5.617 *** 27.237 *** 5.830 *** 27.146 *** 5.035 *** 27.409 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent and obtained using the plausibility threshold
of ± 40%, the dynamic user cost, the apparent interest rate in the WACC definition, and a depreciation rate
of 6% in the capital stock calculation.
In general then, younger firms are more dependent on internal liquidity to finance their
investment decisions and are more sensitive to changes in the user cost of capital and
hence to monetary policy. However, as is often the case with dummy variable interaction
approaches, this result is sensitive to the choice of the cut-off threshold value. It is also
                                                     
18  Using the Gompertz function itself as an interaction variable does unfortunately not provide any
significant results.
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retain their significance (see upper half of table 5). This is reassuring as the inclusion of
interaction variables in small samples often leads to insignificance of both coefficients,
i.e. the coefficient of the base variable and its interaction term.
Table 6:
Differential Effects for Small and Service Sector and Private Firms
Specification (IId-i) (IId-ii) (IIe-i) (IIe-ii) (IIf-i) (IIf-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN
Dep. variable 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I
Cross-sections 80 80 80
Observations 194 195 195
2 1 / − − t t K I 0.257 *** -0.113 0.179 ** -0.146 * 0.322 *** -0.164
0.093 0.077 0.084 0.083 0.101 0.106
t SALES log ∆ 0.067 -0.027 0.044 -0.028 0.065 -0.011
0.062 0.066 0.036 0.056 0.053 0.071
t UC log ∆ -0.166 *** -0.107 *** -0.202 *** -0.153 *** -0.175 ** -0.144 ***
0.059 0.033 0.068 0.046 0.072 0.047
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.002 0.022 *** -0.008 0.032 0.003 0.025 ***
0.003 0.008 0.008 0.023 0.003 0.009
Interaction
variable Size Service Private
Threshold value 30%
2 1 / − − t t K I -0.031 -0.022 0.190 0.161 -0.162 0.101
0.141 0.194 0.134 0.153 0.139 0.137
t SALES log ∆ 0.042 0.132 0.177 ** 0.248 *** 0.031 0.062
0.074 0.079 0.088 0.094 0.066 0.087
t UC log ∆ 0.078 0.059 0.148 0.074 0.076 0.057
0.103 0.074 0.092 0.060 0.086 0.059
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.013 0.097 ** 0.010 -0.013 -0.008 0.001
0.029 0.041 0.009 0.024 0.009 0.018
R-Squared 0.168 0.680 0.210 0.642 0.179 0.631
Adj. R-Squared 0.132 0.417 0.176 0.351 0.144 0.330
F-Statistic 4.664 *** 32.156 *** 6.196 *** 27.412 *** 5.084 *** 26.091 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent and obtained using the plausibility threshold
of ± 40%, the dynamic user cost, the apparent interest rate in the WACC definition, and a depreciation rate
of 6% in the capital stock calculation.
The results with regard to the differences between large and small, private liability and
public or industrial and service firms are less obvious. They are shown in table 6. The
coefficient of the cash level ratio term in specification (IId-ii) has the expected sign and is
significant.  Hence, there is some weak evidence to suggest that smaller firms rely more
on internal liquidity to finance their capital expenditures than larger firms, as they appear
to be more sensitive to the lagged cash to capital ratio. This is in line with prior
expectations, as these firms are thought to have worse access to capital markets. Service
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(IIe-i) & (IIe-ii)). Lastly, there seem to be no significant effects with regard to the
governance structure of firms.
Specification (III): The Effect of Monetary Policy on the User Cost
Specification (III) briefly explores the relationship between the user cost of capital and
the monetary policy indicator. It can clearly be seen that monetary policy signals have the
expected positive impact, i.e. a positive change in the Belgian 3-month money market
interest rate implies a positive change in the user cost. Also the lagged value of the
monetary policy indicator is positively significant. This result corresponds to the results
obtained in previous specifications, where it was shown that the user cost of capital is the
most robust determinant of firms’ investment behaviour.
Table 7:
Monetary Policy Indicator and User Cost of Capital
Specification (IIIa-i) (IIIa-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN
Dep. var. t UC log ∆
Cross-sections 80
Observations 303
t MPI log ∆ 0.951 *** 0.952 ***
0.142 0.132
1 log − ∆ t MPI 0.696 *** 0.689 ***
0.266 0.241
R-Squared 0.230 0.308
Adjusted R-Squared 0.225 0.055
F-Statistic 44.84 *** 98.58 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and *
denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent and
obtained using the plausibility threshold of ± 40%, the
dynamic user cost, the apparent interest rate in the WACC
definition, and a depreciation rate of 6%.
Some Sensitivity Tests
Table A1 in the appendix provides some sensitivity tests. Several alterations were made.
Specification (A1a) includes only firms within the 20 per cent threshold range.
Specification (A1b) changes the equity premium to 3%, while specification (A1c) uses a
depreciation rate of 8% for the calculation of the capital stock and the investment ratio.
The results indicate strong robustness, in particular with respect to the user cost. Despite
the modifications undertaken, the coefficients of the user cost and sales growth, as well as
of the lagged cash to capital ratio keep their sign and remain significant. The exception is
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Again, the user cost of capital coefficient is negatively significant across specifications.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the individual coefficients is very similar to those in
specification (I). In specification (A1c), where a depreciation rate of 8% instead of 6% is
assumed, the user cost and cash to capital coefficients seem to be somewhat higher than
in specification (I).
Table A2 provides some results using different user cost of capital proxies. The results
also suggest that using the dynamic user cost of capital proxy seems to yield better results
than using static proxies. The results obtained in specification (A2c), which makes use of
the dynamic user cost of capital proxy with the Belgian 3-month money market rate
instead of the apparent interest rate, are almost as good as those obtained in specification
(Ib). Nevertheless, we chose to focus on the proxy using the apparent interest rate, as this
comes closest to the way practitioners calculate firms’ specific interest rate. Hence, our
focus on the dynamic user cost definition using the apparent interest rate.
The main aim of this paper was to present first results on the monetary transmission
process for Luxembourg firm-level data. Despite the severe sample size restriction, we
obtain indicative results. The results suggest that the sales accelerator mechanism may be
at work. Its magnitude is, however, very low. This may be due to the short nature of the
data set, and the consequent fact that the period under investigation does not capture a full
business cycle. The strength of the balance sheet and, even more so, the user cost of
capital are significant and robust determinants of the investment behaviour of
Luxembourg firms. Furthermore, young firms in particular show signs of being
financially more constrained, as their investment behaviour is more sensitive to changes
in the user cost of capital changes and/or internally generated liquidity. These results are
consistent with the broad credit channel theory.
Future research will have to address a number of issues. Firstly, the sample width and
length will need to be widened considerably. This will allow several issues to be
addressed. It will be possible to introduce more lags in the empirical estimation, thereby
allowing meaningful long-run coefficients to be obtained. Also, the analysis of
differences between firms would be improved upon. An extended data set may also allow
for the use of more sophisticated estimation methods. Here, we refer to more
sophisticated dynamic panel data techniques, such as the dynamic GMM estimator.
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Sensitivity Analysis of Estimates for the Investment Ratio
Specification (A1a-i) (A1a-ii) (A1b-i) (A1b-ii) (A1c-i) (A1c-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN
PL thresholds ± 20% ± 40% ± 40%
Equity premium 6% 3% 6%
Depr. cap. stock 6% 6% 8%
Dep. variable 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I
Cross-sections 71 80 80
Observations 171 195 195
2 1 / − − t t K I 0.264 *** -0.111 0.243 *** -0.133 * 0.404 *** -0.113
0.087 0.076 0.075 0.074 0.067 0.068
t SALES log ∆ 0.084 * -0.047 0.076 * -0.004 0.061 0.036
0.047 0.067 0.039 0.051 0.046 0.054
t UC log ∆ -0.159 *** -0.127 *** -0.123 *** -0.104 *** -0.206 *** -0.218 ***
0.054 0.034 0.045 0.029 0.071 0.046
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.003 0.032 *** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.003 0.043 ***
0.002 0.008 0.003 0.008 0.003 0.009
R-Squared 0.177 0.659 0.150 0.620 0.292 0.717
Adj. R-Squared 0.157 0.397 0.132 0.336 0.278 0.505
F-Statistic 8.900 *** 61.950 *** 8.380 *** 60.450 *** 19.632 *** 93.557 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent and obtained using the dynamic user cost, and
the apparent interest rate in the WACC definition.
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VIII. APPENDIXTable A2:
Estimates for the Investment Ratio with Different User Cost Definitions
Specification (A2a-i) (A2a-ii) (A2b-i) (A2b-ii) (A2c-i) (A2c-ii)
Method OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN OLS WITHIN
PL thresholds ± 40% ± 40% ± 40%
User cost def. Static Static Dynamic
WACC def. 3-M MMR AR 3-M MMR
Depr. cap. stock  6%  6%  6%
Dep. variable 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I 1 / − t t K I
Cross-sections 80 80 80
Observations 258 258 195
2 1 / − − t t K I 0.230 *** -0.130 * 0.224 *** -0.144 * 0.254 *** -0.114
0.065 0.075 0.067 0.075 0.075 0.073
t SALES log ∆ 0.082 ** -0.035 0.055 -0.060 0.081 ** 0.003
0.038 0.064 0.043 0.065 0.038 0.053
t UC log ∆ -0.349 *** -0.188 -0.070 -0.027 -0.123 *** -0.097 ***
0.132 0.119 0.044 0.034 0.037 0.027
1 1/ − − t t K CASH 0.001 -0.012 0.001 -0.013 0.002 0.026 ***
0.003 0.026 0.003 0.025 0.003 0.008
R-Squared 0.084 0.445 0.061 0.440 0.155 0.620
Adj. R-Squared 0.069 0.180 0.046 0.172 0.137 0.336
F-Statistic 5.795 *** 46.488 *** 4.111 *** 45.493 *** 8.683 *** 60.334 ***
Standard errors below coefficient in lower font. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively. Estimates are heteroskedasticity consistent. 3M MMR refers to the Belgian 3-month
money market rate.
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